Accessibility links

Breaking News

Interview: Amid Ongoing Public Absence, Is Iran's New Leader In Control?

A portrait seen hanging in Tehran on March 11 shows Iran's previous Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei passing the flag to his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei.
A portrait seen hanging in Tehran on March 11 shows Iran's previous Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei passing the flag to his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei.

TEL AVIV -- Iran's new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is probably in charge despite making no public appearance since being appointed on March 8 and amid reports that he was injured in an air strike, according to a leading Israeli expert on Iran.

Speaking to RFE/RL in Tel Aviv on March 11, Raz Zimmt, who is head of the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies, said the question was whether Khamenei would be capable of maintaining "daily contacts with the political and security establishment" to preserve "the ability of the regime to function."

RFE/RL: What's your assessment of where we are now in the war?

Raz Zimmt: It's very clear that both Israel and the United States have achieved very significant military achievements in their attempts to degrade as much as possible Iran's strategic capabilities.

If you look at the ballistic missiles capacities, if you look at the aerial defense system, even some of the remains of the nuclear program in Iran, and certainly the attempts to undermine or to degrade Iran's security forces, the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards [Corps], the Basij, the Iranian Navy, all is going quite well.

Amid Ongoing Absence, Questions Raised About Iran's New Leader
please wait

No media source currently available

0:00 0:02:10 0:00

The question is whether those achievements will allow to achieve the main objectives, which are, in my view: one, to degrade Iran's strategic capabilities to a point where it's going to be very difficult to reconstitute its nuclear program and its ballistic missiles, just as it tried to do after the 12-day war in June.

And then the second objective would be to weaken and undermine the Iranian regime.

RFE/RL: OK, let's take those one at a time, starting with the effective degradation of Iran's military and security capabilities.

Zimmt: When it comes to the missiles, during the 12-day war in June, Israel managed to destroy a lot of the launchers and then to block the entrances and the exits to the so-called underground compounds used to store them.

Raz Zimmt, head of the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, speaking to RFE/RL.
Raz Zimmt, head of the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, speaking to RFE/RL.

If that happens again, it won't make any real difference because at the end of the day Iran will be able to restore the production of its missiles -- unless the United States is capable of targeting and hitting the underground compounds and, more importantly, to hit the production lines.

Concerning the nuclear issue, if the war ends with 450 kilograms of enriched uranium to 60 percent (eds: estimates of how much Iran has vary; this figure was given by US envoy Steve Witkoff), if this fissile material still is left in Iran, it's going to be a very disturbing development because Iran can still have the technical know-how and the capability to break out [and develop nuclear weapons].

RFE/RL: Let's just look at the new leadership emerging in Iran. There's still no sign of Khamenei Jr.

Zimmt: Right. There were some reports that he was actually injured during the first hours of the attack, but he was nominated by the Assembly of Experts, so we should assume he's capable of fulfilling his task, at least.

RFE/RL: So you wouldn't read too much into the fact that we haven't seen him anywhere?

Zimmt: No, it's very obvious that the Iranian regime is fighting for its survival. They know very clearly that Mojtaba Khamenei might become the next target by either Israel or the United States, and so he should hide. The question in my view is whether he's capable of reaching out and continue his daily contacts with the political and security establishment inside Iran, because that's what matters, whether he's capable of...preserving a kind of continuity in preserving the ability of the regime to function.

RFE/RL: Can the regime survive?

Zimmt: Any kind of regime change in Iran -- and we certainly hope for regime change in Iran -- depends in my view on three main conditions. One is to see millions of Iranians in the streets. because otherwise it's going to be almost impossible, in my view, to topple the Iranian regime only through aerial strikes from above.

The second condition would be to see some kind of coalition between different sections and parts of the Iranian society -- students, women, bus drivers, workers, ethnic minorities -- working together.

Last but not least, I would say one condition for a regime change in Iran is to see some cracks and divisions and perhaps defections from within the security apparatus inside Iran. And that's something which is going to be very difficult to achieve because, as we know, the Revolutionary Guards [and] the Basij are very much dependent on the Islamic republic. They know that if the regime collapsed, they might pay the consequences for that. And so they will fight until the end, in my view.

RFE/RL: So no cracks so far?

Zimmt: We might see some weakening of the command and control networks inside Iran. We might see some divisions between different sections of the military and political establishment inside Iran.

But certainly we have not seen any kind of losing control. Just yesterday I looked at information about checkpoints established by the Basij, by the law enforcement forces in Iran. We still have reports about the intelligence agencies in Iran arresting people for treason or for cooperating with Israel.

RFE/RL: If the regime does survive, what's it going to be like?

Zimmt: I'm afraid that if their regime survives, especially if it's under Mojtaba Khamenei, we might see an even more hard-line state, more committed to not just continuing the core strategic goals of Iran -- meaning its missiles, nuclear, regional ambitions -- but we might also see a regime which might take more risks in comparison to [that under] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

For example, we know that throughout the years under Khamenei, Iran was certainly moving forward toward reaching a nuclear threshold state, but Khamenei didn't make a decision to break out.

My concern is that someone like Mojtaba might take the risk of breaking out, especially after realizing that this might be the ultimate deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.

RFE/RL: If the clerical establishment does remain in control, what will this mean for relations with the Gulf states?

Zimmt: They will realize that if this regime is still intact, they will have to live with that. And President Trump is not going to be here forever. I'm not sure if they can trust the Israelis, because some of them at least consider Israel to be a destabilizing force.

Their conclusion might be: We might have to work with Israel, with the United States. To strengthen our defense systems vis-a-vis the Iranians, we should try to find a way to accommodate with Iran because Iran is here to stay, because the Islamic republic might be here to stay.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
  • 16x9 Image

    Ray Furlong

    Ray Furlong is a Senior International Correspondent for RFE/RL. He has reported for RFE/RL from the Balkans, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and elsewhere since joining the company in 2014. He previously worked for 17 years for the BBC as a foreign correspondent in Prague and Berlin, and as a roving international reporter across Europe and the former Soviet Union.

XS
SM
MD
LG