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Czech President Petr Pavel and Moldovan President Maia Sandu meet in Chisinau on March 20. Moldova's elections this past weekend look like a win for Brussels, but the upcoming Czech vote could swing the tide of support for Ukraine.
Czech President Petr Pavel and Moldovan President Maia Sandu meet in Chisinau on March 20. Moldova's elections this past weekend look like a win for Brussels, but the upcoming Czech vote could swing the tide of support for Ukraine.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two elections: the Moldovan election and its consequences for the EU and Ukraine and the upcoming Czech elections and their impact on the bloc.

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Briefing #1: What's At Stake In The Czech Elections?

What You Need To Know: When Czech voters head to the polls this weekend, many fear the country may turn away from its pro-European path, taking away one of Ukraine's staunchest supporters as its battle to repel invading Russian forces nears a fourth year.

Most polls indicate that billionaire Andrej Babis and his populist ANO party will win the parliamentary elections on October 3-4 with around 30 percent of the vote. That means Babis would have to form a coalition government with fringe parties that would bring the country closer to Viktor Orban's Hungary and Robert Fico's Slovakia in terms of its outlook on Ukraine: stopping aid for Kyiv and becoming less enthusiastic about Czech membership in Western institutions.

While not in total alignment with Moscow's positions, Prague would become more vocal on the need to immediately stop the war and aim for peace -– most likely on the Kremlin's terms. Expect less harsh rhetoric toward China, as well.

Polling and political analyst Michael Ashcroft said in an analysis that the Czechs may join "what is from Kyiv's point of view a worrying trend in Central and Eastern Europe, with the existing stance of the Hungarian and Slovakian governments and the new Polish president much less inclined to defend Ukrainian sovereignty."

"The consequences could include isolating Ukraine from Western European partners, disrupting military supplies and sowing further division in the alliance," he added.

Just as it did in Moldova -- where elections last weekend saw a massive Russian disinformation campaign try and swing voters away from pro-Europe parties -- the Kremlin has been looking to take advantage of the waning support for aid to Ukraine that has help fueled Babis's rise back to prominence.

Deep Background: A Czech research group uncovered nearly 300 anonymous TikTok accounts aimed at amplifying pro-Russian narratives and backing radical parties in the final weeks of the election campaign.

The Center For Research Into Online Risks said in a statement on September 28 that Czech TikTok accounts with millions of followers "are systematically spreading pro-Russian propaganda and support for anti-system parties through manipulated engagement."

The center added that the accounts are not tied to a single political entity, instead "combining support for multiple anti-system parties simultaneously."

"The cumulative reach of these accounts is 5 to 9 million views per week, more than the combined official accounts of the leaders of the largest Czech political parties on TikTok," it said.

Drilling Down:

  • Analysts say the key thing to look out for now is which parties gain enough votes to enter parliament as Babis will likely need a coalition to govern.
  • Spolu (Together), an alliance of center-right parties that includes the incumbent Prime Minister Petr Fiala's Civic Democrats, is polling at around 20 percent, whereas the other parties of the current pro-Western coalition government Stan (Mayors and Independents) and the Pirates are predicted to end up with 10-12 percent each.
  • All of these parties have said they have no interest in joining a coalition with ANO or even backing it with votes to pass legislation as a single-party minority government.
  • But this is pre-election talk, and their tune could change after the vote, especially amid growing fears that more radical coalition alternatives could derail the Czech Republic's pro-Western course. As junior coalition partners, these parties could demand key posts in the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry.
  • Secondly, there are factions in the current government, notably in the Civic Democrats, that share ANO's political positions -- committed to NATO but weaker on EU membership where it has voiced clear opposition to euro adoption and Brussels policies such as mandatory refugee quotas and the green deal.
  • But the Central European country could also change radically if Babis teams up with any of the current opposition parties that are even more radical than ANO. These include the far-right SPD, polling above 10 percent, as well as a smaller far-right outfit AUTO (Motorists For Themselves) and the far-left Stacilo (Enough), both of which are expected to clear the 5 percent threshold needed to gain seats in parliament.
  • Governing with any of these would likely lead to a real rapprochement with Orban and Fico, both of whom have been critical of aid to Ukraine and are also in the vanguard of countries in Europe that continue to purchase Russian oil and natural gas following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
  • A key figure in what follows the voting will be pro-Western President Petr Pavel, who plays a role in government formation as well as foreign policy in general. Pavel, a former senior NATO general, has made it clear he won't allow the government to stray too far from the Western course.
  • Babis has been a constant fixture of Czech politics for the past 15 years, first serving as finance minister and deputy prime minister before leading the country from 2017 to 2021, as well as attempting to become president only to be trounced by Pavel in 2023.
  • One of the country's richest people, with considerable stakes in agribusiness and media, his time in the public spotlight has been dogged by legal disputes and accusations of conflicts of interest and EU subsidy fraud.
  • It's also his business interests that many believe could keep him, and by extension the Czech Republic, anchored in the West as good relations between France, Germany, and Austria as well as the continued flow of EU agriculture and cohesion funds are more important than anything Beijing and Moscow can offer.
  • Babis has chartered a more populist course in recent years and was one of the creators of the biggest populist forces on the Continent: Patriots For Europe, a political family also consisting of Orban's Fidesz, Marine Le Pen's National Rally, Spain's Vox, and Austria's Freedom party. He has also voiced support for Fico's Smer party even though it is not formally part of this alliance.
  • Rallying against all things Brussels, environmentalism, and immigration, they would also find sympathetic ears beyond Central Europe with right-wing populists of various hues on the rise or in power in many other Western capitals as well.


Briefing #2: What To Make Of The Moldovan Election Results?

What You Need To Know: Moldovan President Maia Sandu's Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) looks set to come out on top of crucial elections despite what appears to have been a concerted disinformation campaign from the Kremlin.

The real winner may be Brussels.

PAS, a pro-Western party in one of Europe's poorest nations, faced a stiff challenge from its biggest rival, the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, an alliance of pro-Russia parties led by the former Moldovan President Igor Dodon.

The result, wherein PAS is predicted to have taken at least 54 of parliament's 101 seats, is stunning given many polls had the two factions neck and neck, with the Kremlin putting considerable effort into trying to tip the balance in its favor.

With Moldova crammed between Ukraine and NATO and European Union member Romania, Brussels was on edge for weeks leading up to the September 28 vote. A pro-Russia win would have put a major wedge into its eastern flank at a time when Moscow appears emboldened to test the West's resolve while grinding out gains on battlefields in Ukraine.

It appears it can now breathe a sigh of relief that Moldova will remain outside of the Kremlin's reach, at least for the meantime.

"Moldova's pro-European victory is a lesson for all Europe on how to defend against Russian interference," according to Siegfried Muresan, a European member of parliament and vice president of the European People's Party. "Moldova remains firmly anchored on the pro-European path. Good news for the people of Moldova! Good news for Europe!"

Deep Background: The result is a political hat trick for Sandu, with the parliamentary election win coming less than a year after she was returned to the presidential palace and a referendum on EU membership that was won by a whisker.

The stakes were indeed monumental in a vote that was very much seen as a choice between Brussels and Moscow, and neither side made any secrets about who they were backing.

In the run-up, Russia claimed NATO was preparing to "occupy" Moldova, though it gave no evidence and has repeatedly accused the government in Chisinau of "anti-Russian hysteria."

Sandu, and others, accused the Kremlin of "pouring hundreds of millions of euros" into the country to spread disinformation.

In recent weeks, Moldovan authorities followed up these allegations by carrying out police raids throughout the country aimed at what they called "preparation of mass riots and destabilization, which were coordinated from the Russian Federation through criminal elements."

Two pro-Russian parties, the Heart of Moldova and Moldova Mare (Greater Moldova), were also barred from participating in this past weekend's vote after allegations of voter bribery, illegal party financing, and money laundering. The final decision on Greater Moldova was made on September 28, hours after the vote began.

The EU, normally strictly neutral about elections in member states and candidate countries, made little effort of hiding its allegiances to PAS, with a European Commission spokesperson noting that Russia was "deeply interfering in the electoral process."

But it didn't stop there.

Numerous European leaders showed up in Chisinau in recent times with obligatory photo-ops with Sandu, sanctions on pro-Russia politicians have been imposed and enlarged in the last couple of years, and a 1.9 billion euro ($2.23 billion) growth plan for the next three years was unveiled in early 2025 to finance infrastructure and energy projects in the country.

Drilling Down:

  • Perhaps the coup de grace was delivered just three days before the vote when Greece allowed for the extradition of the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. The image of the lead suspect in a long-running investigation into the disappearance of some $1 billion from banks back in 2014 arriving in handcuffs in Chisinau was just the tonic that Sandu, who has built her entire career on fighting graft, needed.
  • The fact is the EU simply could not afford to lose this vote. Since the Georgian Dream clung to power in parliamentary elections in Georgia last fall, Tbilisi has slipped away from talks about bloc membership, even if the country still nominally is a candidate.
  • With no end in sight for the war in Ukraine and the momentum on the battlefield still favoring Russia, Moldova remains the only country in the club's eastern neighborhood that has a viable chance of becoming a member.
  • The goal of achieving that this decade remains after these elections. Chisinau and Brussels are ready to open negotiations on all 33 enlargement chapters. It can go fast as the EU is keen to add at least a few more members both from the Western Balkans and the east before the next European elections in 2029.
  • So far, nothing has moved as Moldova and Ukraine are coupled in the process and Hungary is blocking Kyiv's EU path due to minority rights issues. It could well be that Moldova now moves ahead without Ukraine, potentially even later this year.
  • The PAS win is a Ukrainian win, as well.
  • An important hub for the war-torn country, Kyiv could ill-afford having another hostile neighbor, this time to its west. Now it could well be that Moldova is the locomotive that pulls Ukraine with it into the EU.
  • That is what EU officials had in mind when both countries were given the green light to join the bloc three years ago. The pro-European victory at least ensures that the possibility is still real.


Looking Ahead

There are two summits in Copenhagen this week, starting with an informal gathering of all EU leaders on October 1. The discussion there will focus on European defense, notably issues like a potential drone wall and issues related to Ukraine, including its stalled EU accession talks, sanctions on Russia and how to finance Kyiv going forward.

On October 2, leaders from most European countries meet for the biannual European Political Community summit. Don't expect any concrete outcomes but a flurry of political speed-dating.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

A French Air Force Dassault Rafale B fighter jet configured for air-to-air weaponry is deployed at an unspecified location in the Polish airspace during an exercise as part of NATO's Eastern Sentry operation on September 13.
A French Air Force Dassault Rafale B fighter jet configured for air-to-air weaponry is deployed at an unspecified location in the Polish airspace during an exercise as part of NATO's Eastern Sentry operation on September 13.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: NATO's new eastern flank operation and the likely winner of this year's Sakharov Prize.

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Briefing #1: NATO's New Operation Eastern Sentry

What You Need To Know: Two days after an unprecedented drone incursion by Russia on Polish territory on September 10, NATO unveiled its response: Operation Eastern Sentry. The mission kicked off immediately on September 12 but will be fleshed out further in the coming weeks.

The whole idea, according to the military alliance, is to strengthen its posture, connectivity, and flexibility along NATO's entire eastern flank. While the focus right now is on Russia drones and geographically on Poland, it is multidomain -- meaning land, sea, and air forces are involved -- and is meant to plug gaps from the North Sea to the Black Sea.

It was made clear, however, that it will only be in NATO territory, meaning there are no plans to enter western Ukraine to protect the skies. While Kyiv would very much welcome such a move, and there is an argument for targeting Russian drones much earlier, many NATO allies are fearful this could bring them closer to a direct conflict with the Kremlin.

Deep Background: The key goal now is to move toward an integrated system. Previously, individual NATO allies conducted air policing in different locations, with NATO providing supplementary support on a case-by-case basis, depending on the threat assessment.

The idea now is to have more resources linked to each other across the entire eastern flank, be it missiles or anti-drone technology. It is inspired by a similar operation, Baltic Sentry, which was launched earlier this year as a response to a number of alleged undersea sabotage activities by Moscow in the Baltic Sea.

NATO officials RFE/RL has been in touch with on condition of anonymity view that operation as a success, pointing out there have been no recent attempts to sever cables or other infrastructure in the region. And while it will be trickier to prevent all drones from getting into NATO territory, the thinking here is a beefed-up presence will make "Russia think twice before testing again."

Eight countries have already joined Eastern Sentry and placed assets at the disposal of NATO's supreme allied commander (SACEUR) Alexus Grynkewich. More are expected to follow suit.

France was the first to come forward -- with three Rafale fighter jets, which are to be stationed in Poland, as well as an Airbus A400M military transport aircraft. Britain will have some of its Typhoon jets fly defense missions in Polish skies, and Germany has moved four of its Eurofighters closer to its eastern neighbor, ready to conduct sorties at any moment.

Italy and Denmark have both also signaled they will provide jets. Additionally, Copenhagen has deployed a military ship in the eastern Baltic Sea. Spain and Sweden will also contribute, while the Czech Republic is actually placing some special forces troops in Poland and sending three helicopters, as well.

Drilling Down:

  • Two things stand out here. First, the lack of any new American assets being provided to Eastern Sentry so far. When asked about this at a press briefing, Grynkewich half-joked that "as far as US military assets [are concerned]…I'm right here, and I'm involved" before adding that "the United States commitment to the integrated military structure of the Alliance remains."
  • The United States has more than 10,000 troops stationed in Poland, and that number could even increase. While there are widespread reports about Washington redeploying military personnel from Europe to Asian theaters, NATO officials who spoke to RFE/RL were adamant they have been given no indication troop numbers will be reduced on the eastern flank anytime soon.
  • The second issue is that the commitment to Eastern Sentry has so far been very focused on expensive fighter jets and other costly equipment. This was one of the criticisms of the Polish and NATO response to the September 10 incursion: that multimillion-dollar fighter jets were used for protection against cheap drones.
  • While some European officials admit that Warsaw wants "a show of force," others acknowledge this isn't economically sustainable in the long run. Or as one senior NATO official put it: "We, of course, recognize that the best way to defeat drones is not with a very expensive missile fired from a very, very expensive plane."
  • Eastern Sentry is thus a sort of sudden measure until a potential "drone wall" can become a reality and complement what is already out there.
  • NATO will be central to building such a system, and with the EU signaling readiness to fund it, the project looks likely to happen, but it is two to three years away in the best-case scenario.
  • In the meantime, the military alliance is looking at Latvia's pioneering work with acoustic sensors that detect drones faster, as well as new munitions that allow aircraft to use cheaper weapons, both of which could happen rather quickly.
  • Mobile fire teams are another model NATO could adapt from Ukraine's experience. Kyiv has been using these small, fast-moving units armed with machine guns or man-portable air-defense systems with increasing success on the battlefield.
  • As Grynkewich put it when pressed by the media after unveiling Eastern Sentry: "It's time to take a fresh look at this. And we're always learning. NATO is a learning organization."


Briefing #2: Who Will Win This Year's Sakharov Prize?

What You Need To Know: The awards season is upon us -- at least when it comes to prizes of strong political resonance. All eyes will, of course, be on the Norwegian Nobel Committee when it announces the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 10, especially as some countries have nominated US President Donald Trump. But there is another prestigious honor that will be announced this fall -- the annual Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, the European Union's top human rights award.

While the American president has not been proposed for this 50,000 euro ($59,000) prize, many individuals and organizations from RFE/RL's coverage area were nominated, including Serbian student protesters, the Budapest Pride event, Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut, and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli together with her country's pro-democracy movement. They are up against other nominees such as Palestinian journalists and development workers, and, rather controversially, the recently assassinated American conservative political activist Charlie Kirk.

Deep Background: The award is run entirely by the European Parliament. Created in 1988 in honor of the Russian scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, it has become one of the chamber's key public relations tools, with repressive regimes often lashing out at European lawmakers over some nominations and winners.

It is not uncommon for Sakharov Prize winners to go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize down the line, with examples including the Pakistani education activist Malala Yousafzai and the Congolese humanitarian Denis Mukwege.

The nominations -- which this year will be officially presented on September 23 at a joint session of the European Parliament's foreign affairs, development and human rights committees -- are usually put forward by the parliament's various political groups or at least 40 its members (MEPs). The deadline for these nominations passed last week, and the groups have already publicly communicated who their respective nominees are.

The September 23 event is essentially an occasion to make the public case for your nominee because the political jockeying about which three will be shortlisted -- and who the eventual winner will be -- starts now.

Drilling Down:

  • Size also matters. The shortlisting happens on October 16 this year, when members of the European Parliament's foreign affairs and development committees will hold a secret vote on their favorite.
  • It's strictly one member, one vote, and the three candidates who get the most support are the ones shortlisted. Since the ballot is secret, no one officially communicates the final result, but the media tend to get hold of the numbers and it tends to be tight. Normally less than a handful of ballots determines the final trio.
  • Party discipline is key, with MEPs often pressured to vote for the candidate put forward by their political group. With membership of the two committees determined by the size of the political groups, it becomes a numbers game.
  • Things are complicated further by nominees who aren't backed by a political group but rather by a collection of MEPs across the political spectrum. This makes everything rather unpredictable.
  • That unpredictability often prevails all the way up until the final decision, which will be taken on October 22. This is not made by any committee, however, but by the European Parliament's Conference of Presidents, which consists of the president of the chamber, Roberta Metsola, and leaders of the eight political groups. The vote is secret as well and deliberations can be long, but again: The bigger the political group, the weightier its vote.
  • Who will be shortlisted and who will be the eventual winner? Logic suggests it will be Andrzej Poczobut given he is backed by the largest group in the chamber, the center-right European People's Party (EPP).
  • "They tend to get their way." as one European Parliament official recently put it to RFE/RL when discussing the prize. It helps Poczobut has also been nominated by the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the fourth-largest group. These two teamed up in 2024 to successfully promote the Venezuelan opposition politicians Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez for the Sakharov award.
  • Officials from the EPP and the ECR told RFE/RL they believe a win for Poczobut could help him get released from prison, especially since Aleksandr Lukashenko's authoritarian regime has started to free political prisoners. The releases follow a sweeping crackdown on civil society and opposition activity after Belarus's disputed 2020 presidential election, which was widely condemned as rigged.
  • But it is far from certain that Poczobut will get the nod. The second-biggest group, the center-left S&D, has put forward journalists and humanitarian aid workers in conflict zones represented by the Palestinian Press Association, the Palestine Red Crescent Society, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
  • The more left-wing and smaller Left group has nominated a number of Palestinian journalists. If these two consolidated their respective nominations and chose a Palestinian individual or organization, they could potentially have the numbers to prevail.
  • The numbers probably won't favor Budapest Pride, put forward by the Greens, who aren't much of a political force these days, nor the Serbian student protesters backed by the liberal Renew group, which is only the fifth-largest grouping. Charlie Kirk is also a nonstarter as he is favored by the smallest faction, the far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations, which no other political family wants to cooperate with.
  • One potential dark horse and a possible compromise choice is the jailed Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, who is backed by 61 MEPs from various political parties. Normally, that might not be enough to even get her shortlisted. But almost all political groups -- including both the EPP and S&D -- considered nominating her before opting for others.
  • Amaglobeli is widely recognized and admired in the chamber. A Georgian has never won the prize before, and the house is keen to send a message to Tbilisi. It's a long shot, though, as political groups tend to be disciplined, but this year the race is more open than ever.

Looking Ahead

On September 26-27 the chiefs of defense of NATO's 32 member states meet in Riga, Latvia for their annual autumn gathering. The meeting will be closely watched by media considering both the recent incursion of Russian drones in Polish and Romanian airspace and the violation of Estonian airspace by a Russian fighter jet a few days later. The military alliance has beefed up the presence on its eastern flank, but expect a lot of questions about what more NATO can do to protect its citizens.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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